Computer Simulations of Criminal Deterrence Download

Author: Pieter Van Baal
Edition:
Binding: Paperback
ISBN: 9054544430

Computer Simulations of Criminal Deterrence: From Public Policy to Local Interaction to Individual Behaviour

This study analyzes data that has been generated with a new computer program called ThESE (The Erasmus Simulation Environment), written by the author. Get Computer Simulations of Criminal Deterrence computer books for free.
ThESE is a simulation environment that models an artificial society of citizens who individually and repeatedly face a decision to comply with rules or transgress them. Rule transgression gives an economic advantage for citizens. However, a law-enforcement agency occasionally checks the behavior of the citizens, and those who do not comply are punished. Starting within an individual bounded rational decision framework, ThESE is designed to investigate the relation between individual assessments of the certainty of legal sanctions, locally determined informal sanctions, and aggregate outcomes. Check Computer Simulations of Criminal Deterrence our best computer books for 2013. All books are available in pdf format and downloadable from rapidshare, 4shared, and mediafire.

Computer Simulations of Criminal Deterrence Download

ThESE is a simulation environment that models an artificial society of citizens who individually and repeatedly face a decision to comply with rules or transgress them. Rule transgression gives an economic advantage for citizens. However, a law-enforcement agency occasionally checks the behavior of the citizens, and those who do not comply are punished. Starting within an individual bounded rational decision framework, ThESE is designed to investigate the relation between individual assessments of the certainty of legal sanctions, locally determined informal sanctions, and aggregate outcomes hESE is a simulation environment that models an artificial society of citizens who individually and repeatedly face a decision to comply with rules or transgress them. Rule transgression gives an economic advantage for citizens. However, a law-enforcement agency occasionally checks the behavior of the citizens, and those who do not comply are punished. Starting within an individual bounded rational decision framework, ThESE is designed to investigate the relation between individual assessments of the certainty of legal sanctions, locally determined informal sanctions, and aggregate outcomes.

Related Computer Books